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Abstract
This paper develops a model and derives novel testable implications of referral-based job
search networks in which employees provide employers with information about poten-
tial job market candidates that they otherwise would not have. Using unique matched
employer-employee data that cover the entire workforce in one large metropolitan labor
market over a 20 year period, we nd strong support for the predictions of our model.
We rst show that rms are more likely to hire minority workers from a particular group
if the existing share of workers from that group employed in the rm is higher. We then
provide evidence that workers earn higher wages, and are less likely to leave their rms,
if they were hired by a rm with a larger share of minority workers from their own group
and are therefore more likely to have obtained the job through a referral. The eects
are particularly strong at the beginning of the employment relationship and decline with
tenure in the rm. These ndings have important implications in suggesting that job
search networks help to reduce informational deciencies in the labor market and lead to
productivity gains for workers and rms.
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11 Introduction
Several studies show that at least one third of employees have obtained their current
job through family members or friends, pointing towards the importance of informal
social networks in the job search process.2 Such networks may serve as an information
transmission mechanism and therefore have the potential to enhance the eciency of
the labor market by reducing informational uncertainties and search frictions. So far,
however, little is known about how job search networks actually operate, and whether
they indeed lead to eciency gains.
One way how information can be exchanged within networks is among potential em-
ployees, by informing each other about job opportunities (see, for example, models by
Topa, 2001, and Calv o-Armengol and Jackson, 2004, 2007). In this paper, we focus
on an alternative information transmission mechanism in which employees refer network
members to their employers, and thereby provide them with information about potential
job market candidates that they otherwise would not have (see also the referral models
by Montgomery, 1991, Simon and Warner, 1992, and, more recently, Galenianos, 2011).
Based on a theoretical search model that encompasses both uncertainty in the labor
market and the possibility of hiring through formal channels or through the network, we
propose novel empirical implications of referral-based job search networks. We test these
implications using unique matched employer-employee social security data, covering all
workers and rms in one large German metropolitan area over a 20 year period. Similar
to Borjas (1992, 1995), Bertrand et al. (2000), and Bandiera et al. (2009), we dene
networks to operate along ethnic minority-group dimensions.3
Our model builds on the learning-matching model by Jovanovic (1979, 1984). We
extend his analysis by distinguishing between recruitment through networks and through
the external market, and by endogenizing the probability of obtaining a job through
2See, for instance, Granovetter (1974, 1995), Corcoran et al. (1980), Holzer (1988), Gregg and
Wadsworth (1996), and Addison and Portugal (2002).
3Evidence from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) supports the importance of ethnicity-
based networks in the German labor market. For the year 2001, 62.3% (55.7%) of the 2,037 non-German
citizens in the sample cite as their rst (third) befriended person someone who is also a foreign citizen,
compared to only 4.2% (3.9%) of the German citizens in the sample. Of those 62.3%, 92.4% (90.3%) cite
as their rst (third) befriended person someone who comes from the same country of origin.
2a referral and relating it to the workforce composition of the rm. The key dierence
between the referral and external market is that the worker's match-specic productivity
is more uncertain in the external than in the referral market. The model implies that
a rm is more likely to hire a minority worker from a particular group, rather than
a majority worker or a worker from another minority group, if the share of existing
minority workers from that group in the rm is higher. This is because the likelihood
that a minority worker from that group is picked to make a referral is increasing in this
share. We nd strong support of this prediction, even after controlling for observable
worker and rm characteristics and detailed measures of the supply of minority workers.
Our model further predicts that workers who have obtained their job through a referral
earn initially, at the beginning of the employment relationship, higher wages, and are less
likely to leave their rm, than workers who were hired through the external market.
However, the model also predicts that both the wage and the turnover advantage of
referral hires declines with tenure in the rm. This is because a larger uncertainty of the
worker's productivity implies a larger opportunity for future wage growth, as workers are
partially insured against low realizations of their productivity by becoming unemployed
(see Jovanovic 1979, 1984). Consequently, referral hires turn down wage oers that
otherwise identical external hires would accept and are therefore initially better matched
than external hires. However, since low realizations of the match-specic productivity
lead, over time, to separations of the least suitable workers from their rms, the dierence
in match quality, and hence in wages and turnover probabilities, between external and
referral hires declines with tenure in the rm.
In our data, we do not directly observe whether a worker obtained his job through
the external or the referral market. However, according to our model, the probability of
a referral hire is increasing in the share of workers from the same ethnic group in the
rm at the time of the hire, which is why we use this share as a proxy for a referral hire.
As predicted, we nd that, once we control for the non-random sorting of workers into
rms, minority workers initially earn higher wages, but experience slower wage growth, if
the share of minority workers of the own group one period before the worker was hired is
3higher. Furthermore, a higher share of workers of the own minority group in the rm at
the time of the referral initially lowers turnover of minority workers, but this eect also
declines with tenure in the rm. Our baseline ndings indicate that a 10 percentage point
increase in the share of workers from the own minority group in the rm prior to the hire
increases wages in the rst year at the rm by 0.68%, and wages in subsequent years
by, on average, 0.10%. At the same time, such a 10 percentage point increase implies
that the worker is 21.9 percentage points more likely to have obtained his job through a
referral. Assuming linearity, a referral thus raises wages of workers in their rst year at
the rm by 3.1%, and wages in subsequent years by 0.5%. These wage eects are stronger
for young and low-skilled workers who have the most to gain from a referral.
Using the structure of our model, we nally compute that uncertainty in the referral
market is 46.8% lower than in the external market, and that referrals, through the pro-
vision of additional information to employers, increase total welfare in the economy by
0.75%. Overall, our ndings provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that, through re-
ferrals, job search networks help to reduce informational deciencies in the labor market
and lead to productivity gains for rms and workers.
Our paper is most closely related to the literature on job search networks. Most of
the existing evidence on such networks comes from surveys where workers are asked how
they found their current job (see Ioannides and Loury, 2004, for an excellent overview
of the literature). Granovetter (1974) was one of the rst to document the widespread
use of friends and relatives in the job search process. The existing evidence on how
such use aects wages is mixed. For instance, while Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002)
report that individuals who received help from fraternity/sorority contacts were more
likely to obtain high-paying jobs, Bentolila et al. (2010) nd signicant wage discounts
for jobs found through family and friends.4 Loury (2006) oers a potential explanation,
4Kugler (2003) also nds positive returns to employee referrals, although these disappear once the
sector of employment is controlled for. Patel and Vella (2007) provide evidence that new arrivals of
immigrants choose the same occupations as their countrymen, and that this occupational choice is
positively associated with their earnings. Holzer (1987), in contrast, nds no positive wage eects.
Loury (2006) emphasizes the importance of the type of job contact, showing that workers who nd their
job through a referral of high-wage-oer contacts { in her analysis prior generation male relatives {
earn more initially but experience slower wage growth than workers who nd their job through either
low-wage-oer contacts or formal methods. Pellizzari (2010) provides an overview of wage dierentials
4arguing that depending on their quality, social contacts can either lead to longer job
tenure and high wages because they indicate better matches or to longer job tenure and
low wages because they indicate a worker's limited range of job alternatives. A key
concern in this literature is that employees and employers who rely more on networks
in their job search process may not be randomly selected. An important contribution
of our paper is that the longitudinal nature of our data allows us to identify the causal
impact of referrals on wages and turnover under much weaker assumptions than in the
existing literature: we eliminate any bias due to the fact that low productivity workers
and rms may use networks in their job search process more or less intensively than high
productivity workers and rms.
Similar to us, recent research by Bayer et al. (2008) and Hellerstein et al. (2008)
does not rely on survey evidence on job search methods to test for the existence of job
search networks, but investigates instead whether network members cluster together in
the same work-location or rm. These papers dene networks locally, as individuals
living very closely together. Kramarz and Nordstr om Skans (2007), on the other hand,
focus on the importance of family-based networks during the transition from school to
work, and analyze whether rms are more likely to hire children of current employees
than otherwise comparable job market candidates. Oyer and Schaefer (2009), in turn,
look at networks formed by attending the same educational institution. Specically,
they analyze how graduates of law schools group into law rms and nd evidence that
partners hire graduates from their own law school with a much higher probability than
randomization would predict. In a similar spirit, Giuliano et al. (2009) and  Aslund
et al. (2009a) show that the race or immigrant status of managers aects the racial
or immigrant composition of new hires, using data from one large U.S. retail rm and
Swedish social security data, respectively. We complement these studies by analyzing
ethnicity-based networks, dened as individuals of the same ethnic group living in a
large metropolitan area. We go beyond these papers by presenting novel evidence on
the productivity of networks, and by providing a theoretical framework that allows us to
between jobs found through informal and formal methods in a number of European countries.
5interpret our ndings in a concise manner.
Four recent papers provide, like our paper, both a theoretical and empirical analysis
on the use of networks in the labor market, but focus on dierent mechanisms than
we do. Schmutte (2009) develops a search model in which workers who are connected to
workers earning high wages are assumed to draw from a better wage oer distribution than
workers who are connected to workers earning low wages. In this paper, the denition
of networks is based on geographic proximity and their eect on wages is identied in a
similar way as in Bayer et al. (2008). In Goel and Lang (2009), networks aect wages
through the arrival rate of job oers. The key nding is that among strongly connected
workers, workers who have obtained their job through formal channels earn higher wages
than workers who obtained their job through networks { the reason being that these
workers are likely to have received two job oers from which to choose, one through
the network and an alternative one through formal channels. Using Canadian survey
data on both the strength of an individual's networks and the job nding method, they
nd empirical support for this prediction. Bandiera et al. (2009) investigate the eect
of social connections between workers and managers on productivity, and relate this to
the incentive scheme under which managers act. Using data obtained from a unique eld
experiment, they nd that managers favor workers with whom they are socially connected
irrespective of the worker's ability if they are paid a xed wage, but not if their wage
depends on workers' average productivities. In line with that, Beaman and Magruder
(2010) show that workers whose pay depends directly on the subsequent performance of
their referrals are more likely to refer co-workers and less likely to refer relatives to their
employer.
Our paper is also related to the literature on ethnic segregation. While most of this
literature has focused on residential segregation5, a few recent papers analyze rm-level
segregation (see, for example, Carrington and Troske, 1998, as well as the series of papers
by Hellerstein and Neumark, 2003, 2008, and Hellerstein et al., 2007, for the U.S., and
 Aslund and Nordstr om Skans, 2009b, for Sweden). While these papers compute measures
5Studies that analyze ethnic segregation at the residential level include Musterd (2005), Cutler et al.
(2008), and Semyonov and Glikman (2009).
6of segregation to test for the clustering of minority workers in the same rms, we instead
investigate how the rm's existing workforce aects its hiring behavior. Unlike these
papers, we focus on a particular mechanism behind ethnic segregation at the rm level,
referral-based job search networks, and provide evidence on the benets of such networks.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we set up a referral
model that forms the basis of our empirical analysis. We describe the data and provide
an overview of the main ethnic minority groups in Germany in Section 3. We then
explain our empirical methods in Section 4, and report results in Section 5. We discuss
the implications of our ndings in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
2 Theory
This section sets up a job search model in which workers provide otherwise unobservable
information about the productivity of their network members to the employer.6 Our
model builds on the learning model by Jovanovic (1979, 1984). We extend his analysis by
distinguishing between recruitment through networks and through the external market,
and by endogenizing the probability of obtaining a job through a referral and relating it
to the workforce composition of the rm.
2.1 Set-up
The economy consists of N workers and L rms which produce with a constant returns
to scale production function. There is free entry of vacancies. Firms and workers live
forever, are risk-neutral, and maximize expected prots and expected utility, respectively.
There are two groups of workers, minority and majority workers.
Each period, workers choose between employment and unemployment, while rms
decide whether or not to post a vacancy. Workers receive unemployment benet b during
unemployment. Firms incur a vacancy cost k each period a position remains unlled.
Productivity y is match-specic and drawn from a normal distribution with mean 
6See also Simon and Warner (1992). Pinkston (2008) provides empirical evidence that is consistent
with this hypothesis.
7and variance 2
: When a rm and a worker meet, they observe a noisy signal b y = y +"
about the worker's productivity, where " is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
2
i: Firms can hire either through the referral (i = R) or through the external (i = E)
market. Referrals provide employers with information that they otherwise would not
have. We model this as a more precise signal in the referral than in the external market,
i.e. 2
R < 2
E: In order to focus on the role of information, we assume that the mean of
the productivity distribution is the same in the referral and external market. Firms and
workers use the signal to update their belief about the worker's productivity. We denote
this updated belief by m = E(yjb y). Let F i(yjmi;2
i); i = R;E, denote the distribution
of the worker's true productivity y, given that his expected productivity is mi.7
Each period, rms and workers fully learn about the worker's true productivity with
probability . With probability ; the job ends for exogenous reasons. Wages are deter-
mined through Nash bargaining, where  denotes the share of the total surplus that is
captured by workers.
We assume a particularly simple network structure: each worker is connected to only
one worker. The network is ethnicity-based: minority workers are only connected to
minority workers, and majority workers are only connected to majority workers. We
make both assumptions for convenience only, and none of our implications depends on
them (see also Appendix A.4). The assumption required is that minority workers are
more likely to be connected to other minority workers than German workers are. There
is strong evidence in favor of this assumption, see footnote 3.
The timing of events in each period is as follows.
1. For each vacancy, the rm randomly picks an employee and asks him for a referral.
If the rm has vl vacancies, then vl employees are simultaneously chosen out of the
rm's existing workforce. If the worker connected to this employee is unemployed,
the rm and this worker meet. If he is employed, the rm hires through the external
market.8


















8Note that the rm's expected value of the match is higher in the referral than in the external
market. Hence, rms have an incentive to rst try to ll the position through referrals before they enter
82. Firm and worker observe a signal about the productivity of the referred worker.
The rm makes a wage oer. If the worker turns down the wage oer, the position
remains vacant and the worker remains unemployed.
3. Workers who have not received a referral oer (uE), and vacancies to which no
worker was referred (vE), enter the external market where rms and workers ran-
domly meet through a constant returns to scale matching function m(uE;vE). Firms
and workers observe a signal about the worker's productivity, and rms make a wage
oer. If the workers decline the wage oers, the positions remain vacant and the
workers remain unemployed.
4. In the next period, employees and rms learn the employee's true productivity with
probability . Firms make a new wage oer. If the employee turns down the wage
oer, he becomes unemployed, and the position becomes vacant.
5. With probability , the match is destroyed for exogenous reasons.
2.2 Value Functions and Optimal Search Behavior
We begin with the decision problem of workers and rms just after the worker's true
productivity y has been revealed. With probability (1   ); the match survives and
the value of the match remains unchanged. With probability ; the job is destroyed for
exogenous reasons. In this case, workers become unemployed and the position becomes
vacant. The worker's and the rm's value of the match, W2 and J2; therefore equal:
W2 = w2 + (1   )W2 + U; and
J2 = y   w2 + (1   )J2 + V;
where w2 denotes the wage paid to the worker,  is the discount factor, U is the value of
being unemployed, and V is the value of a vacancy. Workers capture the share  of the
the external market.
9total surplus so that wages are determined by:
W2   U = (W2   U + J2);
where we use the fact that free entry drives V to 0. There is a reservation match quality
y such that, if y > y, workers prefer to stay and rms prefer to keep the worker, where
y satises W2(y)   U = J2(y) = 0. Notice that y is the same for workers who were
hired through the referral or the external market.
Next, consider the decision problem of workers and rms who have just met through
the external market, and the worker's expected productivity is mE: If hired, the worker
will earn wage wE in the current period. Next period, the job is destroyed for exogenous
reasons with probability  and the worker becomes unemployed. With probability (1  
)(1   ), the job survives, rms and workers receive no new information about the
worker's productivity, and the worker's value of the match remains unchanged. With
probability (1   ), the job survives and the worker's productivity is revealed. In this
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Wages are determined by Nash bargaining:
W
E
1   U = (W
E
1   U + J
E
1 ):
There is a reservation match quality m
E such that, if m > m
E, workers prefer to accept
the wage oer and rms prefer to hire the worker, where m
E satises W E
1 (m




10For the decision problem of workers and rms that have met through the referral mar-
ket, the worker's and rm's value of the match, W R
1 and JR
1 ; can be derived accordingly;
see equations (A-1) and (A-2) in Appendix A.1. There is a reservation match quality m
R
such that, if m > m
R, workers accept the wage oer and rms are willing to employ the
worker, where m
R satises W R
1 (m
R)   U = JR
1 (m
R) = 0:
We derive the value of unemployment U in Appendix A.1; see equation (A-4). We
focus on the steady state equilibrium where the unemployment rate is constant over
time. Equations (A-6) and (A-7) in Appendix A.2 show the outow out of and inow
into unemployment in each period.
2.3 Empirical Implications
2.3.1 Persistence of Minority Hiring
A key implication of our model is that there is persistence in the share of minority workers
in a given workplace. To see this, consider a rm with one vacancy in period    1 that
is lled in period . Suppose that the share of minority workers in this rm in    1 is
S
 1
Minj. Using Bayes' law, the probability that a minority worker, as opposed to a majority





R) + S(1   u)E
F Pr(m > m
E)
uPr(m > m
R) + (1   u)E
F Pr(m > m
E)
; (1)
where u denotes the steady-state unemployment rate and E
F the probability that the rm
meets a worker through the external market. The denominator of the right-hand side of
equation (1) is the overall probability that a worker, whether minority or not, is hired,
either through the referral or the external market.9 The numerator is the probability
that a minority worker is hired, with S denoting the overall share of minority workers in
the population.
9The probability that a referred worker is recruited is equal to the probability that the connection of
the employee chosen to recommend a worker is unemployed, u, times the probability that this worker's
expected productivity exceeds the reservation match quality, m
R: The probability that a worker is hired
through the external market is the product of the probability that no worker was referred to the position,
1 u, the probability that the rm meets a worker through the external market, E
F; and the probability
that the worker's expected productivity exceeds the reservation match quality, m
E.
11The probability that the position is lled with a minority worker, rather than a
majority worker, is increasing in the share of existing minority workers in the rm, S
 1
Minj:
This is because the likelihood that a minority worker is picked to make a referral is
increasing in this share. We begin the rst part of our empirical analysis by investigating
the relationship between the rm's past workforce composition and the composition of
new hires, as shown in equation (1). We describe our empirical strategy in Section 4.1,
and report results in Section 5.1.
Note that our model predicts persistence in the share of minority workers in a given
rm regardless of whether networks help to reduce informational uncertainties in the labor
market. The following implications, in contrast, are a consequence of referrals improving
the quality of the match.
2.3.2 Wage and Turnover Eects
Since the signal about the worker's productivity is less noisy in the referral than in
the external market (2
R < 2
E); the reservation match quality is higher in the referral
than in the external market (m
R > m
E); see Appendix A.3 for a formal proof. The
intuition for this result is simple: a larger uncertainty of the worker's productivity implies
a larger opportunity for future wage growth since workers are partially insured against
low realizations of their productivity by leaving the rm (Jovanovic 1979, 1984). Workers
are therefore willing to accept worse matches if the uncertainty of the match is higher.
Since m
R > m
E; referral hires are on average better matched with their rm than
external hires. Hence, they earn higher wages and are less likely to leave the rm than
external hires. More specically, since only workers whose productivity has not been
revealed yet are better matched, workers who obtained their job through a referral initially
earn higher wages, and are less likely to switch rms, but these eects decline with tenure
(see also Appendix A.3).10
10Note that we have abstracted from on-the-job search. While including job-to-job transitions com-
plicates the theoretical analysis considerably, it does not alter our empirical predictions. Workers who
obtained their job through a referral will, at the beginning of the employment relationship, be better
matched on average, than workers who obtained their job through the external market. They therefore
earn a higher wage and are less likely to move from job-to-job and from job-to-unemployment at the
beginning of the employment relationship.
12In our data, we do not directly observe whether a worker obtained the job through
a referral. Next, we show that this probability is increasing in the share of existing
minority workers in the rm, S
 1
Minj, a variable that we do observe. Consider a rm with
one vacancy in    1 that is lled in period  with a minority worker. The probability









R) + S(1   u)E
F Pr(m > m
E)
: (2)
The denominator is the overall probability that a minority worker was hired, while the
numerator is the probability that a minority worker was hired through the referral mar-
ket. The probability that a minority worker obtained his job through a referral is thus
increasing in the share of minority workers in the rm at    1 at a decreasing rate.
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we test whether minority workers initially
earn higher wages, but experience lower wage growth, if the share of minority workers
of the own type one period before the worker was hired is higher. We also investigate
whether the share of workers of the own type initially lowers turnover, but less and less
so as workers stay with their rms longer. In Section 4.2, we describe in detail how we
account for the systematic sorting of minority groups into rms that typically plagues
this type of analysis. We report our baseline results in Section 5.2.1.
3 Data and Background
3.1 Data and Sample Selection
The data used in our analysis come from German Social Security Records covering more
than two decades, from 1980 to 2001. They comprise every man and woman covered
by the social security system, observed at the 30th of June in each year. Not included
are civil servants, the self-employed, and military personnel.11 The data contain unique
11In 2001, 77.2% of all workers in the German economy were covered by social security and are hence
recorded in the data (Bundesagentur f ur Arbeit, 2004).
13worker and establishment identiers12, as well as an unusually wide array of background
characteristics, such as education13, occupation, and industry. Our denition of ethnic
minority groups is based on citizenship.14 Consequently, individuals with foreign citizen-
ship who were born in Germany are included among the ethnic minority populations.15
The citizenship variable is very detailed, distinguishing between 203 groups. Wages re-
ported are gross daily wages and are right censored at the social security contribution
ceiling. For a detailed description of the data set see Bender et al. (2000).
Our data are particularly suited for our analysis. First, we observe every worker in
every rm, which ensures our ndings are representative for both rms and workers,
and allows us to precisely calculate the ethnicity composition of each rm's workforce.
Second, we are able to follow workers, and their co-workers and rms, over time.
From this data base, we have initially selected all workers aged between 15 and
64 working in one of the four largest metropolitan areas in West-Germany: Hamburg,
Cologne, Frankfurt, and Munich. This strategy is motivated as follows. First, mobility to
and from these cities is fairly low, around 2.8% in one year and 6.9% in 5 years. Hence, we
can think of these cities as local labor markets. Second, ethnic minorities are concentrated
in large cities. While 23.2% of ethnic minorities live in the four largest cities, only 13.9%
of Germans do so. Throughout the paper, we focus on ndings for Munich. The Munich
metropolitan area consists of 10 districts (Kreise), 222 municipalities (Gemeinden), and
is approximately 70 miles in diameter. Baseline results for the other three metropolitan
areas are similar, and can be found in the data appendix (Tables A.1 and A.2).
12Throughout the paper, we use the terms workplace, establishments, and rms interchangeably.
13To improve the consistency of the education variable in our data, we apply the imputation algorithm
suggested by Fitzenberger et al. (2006).
14Until 1 January 2000, citizenship in Germany was exclusively based on descent (ius sanguinis) and
individuals born in Germany by non-German parents were not automatically granted German citizenship.
Naturalization of adults was possible after 15 years of legal residence. Since 1 January 2000, children
born by non-German parents who have legally lived in Germany for at least eight years are automatically
granted German citizenship.
15If an individual changes citizenship over time, we assign her the rst citizenship observed in the
data.
143.2 Minority Groups in Germany
Next, we provide a brief overview of the main ethnic minority groups in Germany. Large-
scale immigration to (West-) Germany started in the mid-1950s as a result of the strong
economic growth at that time. Immigrants originated from countries Turkey, Yugoslavia,
Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Following the recession in 1973/1974, the active
recruitment of immigrants came to a hold. However, subsequent immigration of family
members continued. The second big immigration wave to Germany was a result of the
collapse of the Former Soviet Union and the political changes in Eastern Europe in the late
1980s and early 1990s. The main immigrant groups of this period were, on the one hand,
ethnic German immigrants (so-called Aussiedler), mostly from Poland and the Former
Soviet Union, and, on the other hand, refugees from the wars in Former Yugoslavia.16
Table 1 reports some summary statistics of our sample { workers between 15 and 64
years old covered by the social security system in Munich. In 1990, 13.4% of the workers
in our sample are foreign citizens { which we refer to as minority workers. By 2000, this
share had increased to 15.6%. In the same year, the share of foreign citizens in the overall
population was 8.9% (column (3)), up from 6.7% in 1990 (not reported). The biggest
groups come from Germany's traditional guest worker countries Turkey, Yugoslavia, Italy
and Greece, who make up more than 50% of Germany's overall minority population in
both our sample and in the overall population.
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 1 show the educational attainment of minority workers
in our sample. Individuals, in particular those from the guest worker countries Turkey,
Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece, are considerably less educated than Germans: about 13.0%
of German workers have no post-secondary education (we label these workers as low-
skilled), compared with 41.2% of the minority workers. The share of workers with a
college degree (which we label as high-skilled) is 20.2% for German, but only 8.9% for
minority workers.
The nal column displays, for the year 2000, the average number of years minority
workers have lived in Germany. Numbers refer to minorities between 16 and 64 in the
16For more detailed information on the dierent migration waves and their historical background, see
Bauer et al. (2005).
15overall population, and come from the German Microcensus. Individuals from countries
of the rst migration wave (e.g. Turkey, Italy and Greece) have stayed in Germany for
about 20 years, while individuals from the second migration wave (e.g. Poland and Soviet
Union) have resided in Germany for only 10 and 5 years, respectively.
4 Empirical Strategy
We start by describing how we test for the rst prediction of our model regarding the
persistence in the share of minority workers across rms (Section 4.1). We then turn to
the wage and turnover eects of referrals, and explain how we account for the systematic
sorting of workers into rms to obtain causal estimates (Section 4.2).
4.1 Referrals and Hiring
We begin with directly estimating equation (1): a rm is more likely to hire a minority
worker in period  the higher the share of minority workers in the rm in the previous
period,    1: In our data, there is not only one, but many minority groups (which we
index by the subscript g). Assuming that minority workers are connected only with
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This equation now says that the probability that a minority worker from group g is hired
is increasing in the existing share of minority workers from that group in the rm. In our
baseline specication, we estimate the following regression:
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gj is the share of minority workers from group g among all new hires in rm
j at time ; S
 1
gj is the share of minority workers from the same group in the rm in
   1; one period before the worker was hired, X0
j is a vector of demand side control
16variables, Z
0 1
gj is a vector of supply side control variables, 
g denote minority group
specic year xed eects, and u
gj is an unobserved error term. The key parameter







E): We show in Appendix A.4 that this holds under a more
general network structure than the one assumed, for example if workers are connected to
more than one worker or if networks are only partially ethnicity-based. For the empirical
analysis, we focus on the ve main minority groups in the Munich metropolitan area:
Yugoslavs, Turks, Austrians, Italians and Greeks.17
Firms with a high existing share of workers from a particular group may keep hiring
workers from the same group not because of referrals, but because they demand workers
with particular skills, and minority workers from that group have dierent skill levels than
German workers or minority workers from other groups. To keep the argument simple,
suppose that Turkish workers are predominantly low-skilled, whereas German workers are
predominantly high-skilled. Then rms with a large demand for low-skilled workers will
hire mostly Turkish workers both in the past and the future, leading to a positive estimate
for 1 even in the absence of referrals. In an attempt to deal with these demand side
factors, the control variables in X0
j include the share of low- and medium-skilled workers
and the share of female workers among new hires in period , as well as the share of low-
and medium-skilled workers and the share of female workers in the rm in period    1.
Note that the eect of each of these control variables is allowed to vary by minority group.
Similarly, rms may hire workers from a particular minority group simply because they
are located in areas where many workers from that group reside. In order to address such
supply side factors, the control variables in Z
0 1
gj additionally include the minority share
in the local municipality (there are 222 municipalities in the labor market we consider),
the minority share in the industry of the rm (we distinguish between 12 industries),
and the predicted minority share based on the occupational composition of the rm (we
17Consequently, we have ve observations (one for each minority group) per rm that hired at least
one worker (German or minority) in a given year. Together, the ve main minority groups make up
69% of all minority observations in the sample. We have also carried out the analysis for the 15 biggest
minority groups, which make up 85% of all minority observations, with very similar results.
17distinguish between 88 occupations) in    1.18 Our estimation sample covers the years
1990 to 2001.
4.2 Wage and Turnover Eects of Referrals
Our model predicts that referral hires initially earn higher wages, and are less likely to
switch rms, than external hires, and that these eects disappear with tenure. From
equation (2), the probability of having obtained the job through the referral market is
positively related to the share of workers from the same minority group in the rm one
period before the worker was hired. To test the predictions, we estimate the following
baseline regression:




gj  tenure + X
0
ijt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t + i + fj + "igjt; (5)
where lnwijt is the log daily wage (or an indicator variable equal to 1 if the worker leaves
the rm in t + 1) of worker i belonging to minority group g in rm j in the current time
period t. S
 1
gj is the share of workers of the same minority group in the rm in    1;
one period before the worker was hired. Notice the dierence between the current time
period, denoted by t, and the time period when the worker was hired, denoted by .
Xijt is a vector of (possibly) worker-, rm-, and time-varying control variables (such as
tenure), t, i, and fj denote year, worker, and rm xed eects, respectively, and "igjt
is an i.i.d. error term.
The key parameters of interest are 1 and 2, where 1 measures the impact of the
share of workers from the same ethnic group at the time of the referral on the worker's
log-wage or turnover decision in the rst year of the employment relationship, while 2
measures how this impact varies with tenure in the rm. From our model, we expect
1 > 0 and 2 < 0 in the wage regression, and 1 < 0 and 2 > 0 in the turnover
18For a given minority group g and rm j, the last measure is constructed as
P
o SgoSoj where Sgo
is the share of workers in occupation o in the Munich labor market that belong to minority group g,
and Soj is the share of workers in rm j that work in occupation o. This measure thus captures the
hypothetical minority share of the rm if it hired purely according to its occupational structure, taken
as given the existing distribution of minority workers over dierent occupations.
18regression.
Minority workers may systematically sort into rms with a higher share of workers of
the same ethnic group, leading to biased estimates of 1 and 2. The inclusion of worker
xed eects i eliminates any bias due to the selection of workers of dierent abilities into
rms with a low or high share of workers from the same minority group. Including xed
rm eects fj accounts for low- or high-wage rms predominantly hiring from a particular
minority group. Identication comes from workers moving between rms, and exploits,
conditional on worker xed eects and time-varying supply and demand variables, two
sources of variation in S
 1
gj : rst, the share of workers from a particular minority group
may change over time within the rm, and second, in a given hiring year, the rm may
employ dierent minority groups at varying proportions. As a robustness check, we also
report estimates that include rm-year of hire xed eects (f
j ), and only use the latter
source of variation.
Estimating xed worker and rm eects in large samples as ours is computationally
intensive, which has prompted Abowd et al. (1999) to rely on approximate solutions. We
instead employ the algorithm proposed by Abowd et al. (2002) that calculates the exact
solution of equation (5).19 This procedure does not yield standard errors. We obtain
these via bootstrapping with 30 repetitions.
When estimating (5), we pool all workers, including Germans, in our sample, and
interact all variables in (5) with a dummy variable indicating whether the worker is from
a minority group. Including Germans in the estimation sample implies that both ethnic
minority and German workers are used to estimate the xed rm eects, leading to more
precise estimates.
Our estimation sample covers the years 1990 to 2001. In order to ensure that we
observe the share of workers from the same minority group one period before the worker
is hired, we restrict the sample to workers who joined their rm after 1980, the rst
year available in the data, and whose rm already existed in the year before the worker
19The algorithm is based on the iterative conjugate gradient method and exploits that, due to the
large number of dummy variables, the design matrix is sparse.
19was hired.20 We further restrict the sample to low- and medium-skilled workers because
of wage censoring. This aects about 50% of the high-skilled, but less than 8% of the
medium-skilled and 3% of the low-skilled.21 Our share variable refers to all workers in the
rm, and is computed before these sample restrictions are imposed. To dene workers
from the same minority group, we use the nest classication in the data (for instance,
the workers belonging to the same minority group as a French worker are other French
workers, and not other West Europeans).
5 Results
We begin with testing the rst implication of our model regarding the persistence in
the share of minority workers across rms in Section 5.1. We then turn to the turnover
and wage eects of referrals in Section 5.2, where we also discuss the robustness of the
results, the heterogeneity of the estimated eects, and productivity spillover eects as an
alternative explanation for our ndings.
5.1 Referrals and Hiring
We report our baseline results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2, based on equation (4)
described in Section 4.1. In column (1), we control only for minority group specic year
xed eects, a specication that arises directly from the theoretical model and equation
(3). The results indicate that an increase in the existing share of workers from a particular
minority group in the rm by 10 percentage points increases the share of minority workers
from that group among all new hires in the rm by 5.7 percentage points. We report our
preferred estimate in column (2), were we add our extensive set of demand and supply
side variables. This reduces the estimated eect only slightly, from 5.7 to 5.0 percentage
points. As discussed in Section 4.1, this estimate suggests that among minority workers,
20We include all workers who joined their rm after 1980 in the sample but let our estimation only
cover the period 1990 to 2001 to maintain a representative sample with respect to rm tenure. The
lagged minority shares, however, are calculated using the whole population of workers.
21We drop these censored observations from the sample.
20around 50% obtain their job through a referral.22
In the remaining columns of Table 2, we report results separately by education and
age, controlling for the same set of variables as in column (2). We nd that the impact
of the existing share of workers from a particular minority group in the rm on the
share of minority workers from the same group among all new hires declines with the
education level of the hire, from 0.644 for the low-skilled to 0.103 for the high-skilled.
This is consistent with existing evidence that low-skilled workers are more likely to rely
on friends and relatives in their job search process than high-skilled workers (see, for
example, Borjas, 1998, Ioannides and Loury, 2004, and Wahba and Zenou, 2005). We
nd no signicant dierences by age.
We display the main ndings based on the specication that includes the entire set
of control variables (compare Table 2, column (2)) for the three other metropolitan areas
in Table A.1. In all of these labor markets, the impact of the share of workers from the
same minority group in the rm in the previous period on the probability that a minority
worker from that group is hired is similar in magnitude.
Our model further predicts that rms with a larger than average share of a particular
minority group keep hiring minority workers from that group, and not from other groups.
We investigate this by estimating a multinomial logit model on a sample of newly hired
minority workers. We include the share of each of the ve minority groups in the rm in
the previous period as regressors, and additionally control for the education and gender
of the new hire, the lagged shares of workers with low and medium education in the rm,
the lagged share of women in the rm, and year, district, industry, and occupation xed
eects.23 Results are presented in Table 3 where we report marginal eects, evaluated
at variable means. As predicted by our model, the share of workers from a particular
minority group in the rm increases the probability that a worker from the same minor-
ity group will be hired (diagonal entries), and typically reduces the probability that a
22As a robustness check, we include a full set of rm-minority xed eects and estimate the model in
rst dierences. Following Arellano and Bond (1991), we instrument the lagged change in the minority
group share in a rm with the two period lagged level of the minority share. This reduces the coecient
to 0.316, with a standard error of 0.043.
23For computational reasons it is not possible to control for all 222 municipalities in the multinomial
logit estimation. Instead we move one level up and include 10 district xed eects.
21worker from other minority groups will be employed (o-diagonal entries). For instance,
conditional on the rm hiring a minority worker from one of the ve largest groups, an
increase in the share of Turkish workers in the rm by 1 percentage point increases the
rm's probability of recruiting a Turkish worker by 0.9 percentage points, and reduces
the rm's probability of employing an Italian worker by 0.2 percentage points.
5.2 Turnover and Wage Eects of Referrals
Next, we turn to the wage and turnover implications of our model. A higher share of
minority workers from the same group in the rm one period before the worker was
hired should increase wages, and lower turnover, of minority workers, in particular at
the beginning of the employment relationship. These eects should subsequently decline
with tenure.
5.2.1 Baseline Results
We report our main results based on equation (5) in Table 4. In Panel A, we report the
overall impact of the share of workers from the same minority group in the rm one year
before the worker was hired (`own share') on wages and turnover decisions of minority
workers (that is, without the tenure interaction in equation (5)). We start with OLS
estimates and, in addition to the own share, only control for year xed eects (column
(1)). The estimate on the own share variable of -0.190 in the wage regression implies
that, for a minority worker, a 10 percentage point increase (which roughly corresponds to
an increase of half a standard deviation) in the share of workers from the same minority
group in the rm in the year before the hire took place is associated with a wage decrease
of 1.90%. Including a full set of control variables24 reduces this parameter estimate in
magnitude to -0.068 (column (2)).25
The signicant reduction in our parameter estimate due to the inclusion of control
24These covariates are: the log of the rm size, industry dummies, 5 rm tenure categories (0 years,
1-2 years, 3-4 years, 5-9 years, 10 years), age, age squared, education dummies and a gender indicator.
25Hellerstein and Neumark (2003) and  Aslund and Nordstr om Skans (2009b) report similar ndings
for minority groups in the U.S. and Sweden, respectively. Note, however, that these studies refer to the
current, as opposed to the initial, share of co-workers from the same minority group.
22variables suggests that the sorting of workers into rms is important, and that OLS
estimates are therefore biased. Indeed, controlling for worker xed eects in column (3)
leads to a substantial further reduction in the magnitude of the estimated parameter. The
impact of the share of workers from the same ethnic group on wages, however, remains
negative. It turns positive if we include a full set of xed rm eects instead of the xed
worker eects (column (4)). As described in Section 4.2, our preferred nal specication
includes both worker and rm xed eects and is shown in column (5). The estimate
implies that an increase in the share of workers from the same minority group in the rm
at the time of the referral by 10 percentage points increases the wage of minority workers
by 0.42%.
Turning to the turnover regressions, the OLS results in columns (1) and (2) show that
a higher share of workers from the same minority group in the rm one year before the
hire took place signicantly increases the probability that a minority worker leaves the
rm. However, once we control for both worker and rm xed eects, this changes: an
increase in the own share by 10 percentage points now reduces the probability of leaving
the rm by 0.23 percentage points. This eect is, however, statistically signicant only
at the 10% level.
According to our model, the wage gains due to an increase in the share of workers
from the same minority group in the rm one year before the worker was hired should be
concentrated at the beginning of the employment relationship and decline with tenure.
Similarly, a higher own share should reduce the probability to switch rms initially, but
less and less so with tenure. We conrm these predictions in Panel B of Table 4, where we
include an interaction term between the own share and tenure as an additional regressor.
Focusing on the specication that includes both xed rm and worker eects (column (5)),
an increase in the own share by 10 percentage points raises wages by 0.70% and reduces
turnover by 0.41 percentage points at the beginning of the employment relationships.
Both eects rapidly decrease with tenure.26
26The wage estimate implies that after 3 1/3 years, the eect should become negative. This is a
consequence of the linear specication imposed on the interaction term. Average rm tenure in the data
is only 3.1 years, so that the average worker hired through a referral does not experience much of a wage
penalty at the end of his employment relationship.
23In Panel C of Table 4, we investigate this issue in a slightly dierent manner. Here,
we allow the impact of the own share to vary between a worker's rst year at the rm
and a worker's subsequent years at the rm. The mean wage in subsequent years is a
weighted average of the mean wage of workers whose productivity has not been revealed
yet, and the mean wage of workers whose productivity is known and who have decided to
stay with the rm, where a greater weight is given to the latter if the learning rate () is
higher (see equation (A-12) in Appendix A.5). As predicted by our model, we nd that
once we include rm and worker xed eects, a 10 percentage point increase in the initial
share of workers of the own type raises wages in the rst year by 0.68%, compared to only
0.10% in subsequent years. We nd a similar pattern for turnover: a 10 percentage point
increase in the own share lowers turnover in the rst year by 0.64 percentage points, and
actually increases turnover in subsequent years.
What about the magnitude of these ndings? To assess this, one needs to know by how
much an increase in the initial share of workers from the same minority group raises the
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E). From Table 2 and
equation (4), we obtain 1 = a
a+b = 0:498, so that b
a =
1 1
1 = 1:008. Evaluated at
the median minority share in the rm prior to the hire, ~ S
 1
gj = 2:9%, and the median
share of minority workers in the population, ~ Sg = 1:3%, a 10 percentage point increase
in the share of minority workers from the same group in the rm in the year before the
hire corresponds to an increase in the probability of having obtained the job through a
referral by 21.9 percentage points. Consequently, assuming linearity, a referral increases
wages in a worker's rst year (subsequent years) at the rm by 3.1% (0.5%), and lowers
turnover in the rst year by 2.9 percentage points. In order to put the wage eect into
perspective, Dustmann and Meghir (2005) nd that for medium-skilled workers, the re-
turn to experience beyond the 4th year in the labor market is 1.2%, while the return to
rm tenure is about 2%.
We display ndings for the three other metropolitan areas in Table A.2. In all these
labor markets, the impact of the share of workers from the same minority group in the
24rm at the time of the referral on wages and turnover is similar in magnitude.
5.2.2 Robustness Checks
We perform a number of robustness checks in Table 5, focusing on the wage regressions
that allow the impact of the share of workers from the same minority group at the
time of the referral to dier between the rst year at a rm and subsequent years. For
comparison, column (1) shows our baseline estimate from Table 4, Panel C, column (5),
where we condition on xed worker and xed rm eects.
In column (2), we include rm-year of hire xed eects instead of rm xed eects,
thereby allowing for rm-specic time shocks. Identication is now coming from rms
employing dierent minority groups at varying proportions in a given year. The estimates
increase somewhat in magnitude. In column (3), we only consider the ve main minority
groups (the same as in Tables 2 and 3), and allow all control variables to have a dierent
eect for each minority group.27 Again, results are similar to our baseline ndings. To
control for potential supply side factors, we add in column (4) the share of minority
workers from the same group in the industry and municipality one year before the hire as
additional controls. Like the corresponding share at the rm level, their eect is allowed
to vary between a worker's rst year at the rm and a worker's subsequent years at the
rm. Our overall conclusions are unchanged.
Our baseline specication includes Germans in the estimation sample (see Section
4.2), and therefore restricts the xed rm eect to be the same for the minority and
German population. In column (5), we estimate equation (5) for minorities only and
therefore allow for a minority-specic xed rm eect. The share of workers from the
same minority group in the rm continues to have a positive eect on wages of minority
workers who have just entered the rm. In column (6) we restrict the sample further to
minority workers from Germany's guestworker countries Turkey, Greece, Italy, Former
Yugoslavia, Spain and Portugal. These workers form a fairly homogenous group: they
entered Germany around the same time in the 1960s, and are predominantly low-skilled
27For computational reasons, this is impossible if we include all 203 minority groups.
25(see Table 1). Results are similar to those in column (4).
Finally, in column (7) we include the squared share of workers from the same minority
group in the rm at the time of the referral as an additional regressor. This is motivated by
equation (2) which says that the probability of having obtained the job through a referral
is concave in the own share. In line with this, we nd that the impact of the share of
workers of the own type is strongly non-linear. This specication implies that, evaluated
at the median share of 2.9%, a 10 percentage point increase in the share variable raises
wages in the rst year by 1.25%, which is almost twice as large as our baseline estimate
of 0.68%.
5.2.3 Heterogeneous Eects
Next, we investigate whether the impact of the share of workers from the same minority
group in the rm one year before the worker was hired on wages of minority workers
varies across subgroups of workers. In Table 6, we distinguish between `young' (less or
equal to 30) and `old' (older than 30) workers, as well as between low- and medium-skilled
workers. Otherwise, the specication is the same as in our baseline (Table 4, Panel C,
column (5)). We nd that the share of workers from the same minority group in the rm
at the time of the referral increases wages of minority workers at the beginning of the
employment relationship only among the young and among the low-skilled.
One reason for why the wage eect is particularly pronounced for the low-skilled
could be a higher variance of the match-specic productivity, 2
low > 2
medium; implying
that referrals are particularly valuable for the low-skilled.28 There is some empirical
support for this inequality: Adda et al. (2009) nd that in Germany, the match quality
distribution is more dispersed for the low- than for the medium-skilled.
One explanation for the large wage gains of the young could be that the match quality
of young workers is less certain than the match quality of older workers (2
Eyoung > 2
Eold),
but that this uncertainty can be fully reduced when hiring takes place through a referral



















medium implies a greater
reduction in noise due to referrals.
26(2
Ryoung = 2
Rold): Again, this inequality implies that referrals are particularly valuable
for young workers, as they lead to a larger reduction in uncertainty. In line with this
reasoning, research by, for instance, Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret
(2001) highlights that productivity is particularly uncertain for young workers who have
just entered the labor market.
5.2.4 Productivity Spillover Eects
The ndings are supportive of our referral model in which employees provide their em-
ployers with information about potential job market candidates that they otherwise would
not have. A possible alternative explanation for the empirical patterns we nd is based
on productivity spillover eects: minority workers are more productive if they work with
workers from their own group than if they work with workers from other minority groups
or with natives. The main reason for such productivity spillover eects is a common
language shared by individuals from the same country of origin.29 Spillover eects can
potentially explain why rms with a high share of a specic minority group in the past
continue to hire from this group. Productivity spillover eects may also be able to account
for our ndings that minority workers earn higher wages and have lower turnover rates
in rms that employed a larger share of workers from their own type in the year before
they were hired. Under certain circumstances, they may even provide an explanation for
why these wage and turnover eects are particularly strong for workers who have just
entered the rm (Table 4, Panels B and C): if the language skills of minority workers,
and hence their ability to communicate with natives, improve with tenure in the rm,
then (relative) productivity spillover eects from other workers from the same country of
origin should decline with time in the rm.
However, if this is the underlying mechanism, then there should be no productivity
spillover eects for workers who are identical to native workers in those features that lead
to positive spillovers. To check this, we investigate a group of workers that is identical
29Productivity spillover eects have been extensively studied among pupils in schools, but little work
exists on the level of the rm. The few existing papers focus on a particular industry, or a particular rm
within that industry. Examples include supermarket scanning (Mas and Moretti, 2009), fruit picking
(Bandiera et al., 2005, 2007), and soccer (Ashworth and Heyndels, 2007).
27to natives in their language skills, and very similar in their culture: Austrians. As shown
in Table 1, Austrians make up the third largest immigrant group in the Munich labour
market. If our ndings are driven by productivity spillover eects, the share of Austrians
in the rm one year before the worker was hired should have little or no impact on wages
and turnover behavior of Austrians. However, as we show in Table 7, we nd that a 10
percentage point increase in the share of Austrians in the rm one year before the worker
was hired increases wages of Austrians who have just entered the rm by 0.49% { which
is similar in magnitude to, and not statistically dierent from, the corresponding result
of 0.69% for non-Austrian minority workers. We also nd a signicant negative eect of
the own share in the rm on the rst-year job turnover probability of Austrian workers.
The estimated eect is larger in magnitude than for non-Austrian minority workers but
again not statistically dierent. While these ndings are dicult to reconcile with a
model of productivity spillover eects, they follow from our network model if Austrians
and Germans belong to dierent networks.
6 The Welfare Gain of Referrals
Our baseline ndings indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of workers
from the own minority group in the rm prior to the hire increases wages in a worker's
rst year at the rm by 0.68%, and by 0.10% in subsequent years (Table 4, Panel C,
column (5)). Moreover, such a 10 percentage point increase implies that the worker is
21.9 percentage points more likely to have obtained his job through a referral. Hence,
assuming linearity, a referral raises wages in a worker's rst year at the rm by 3.1%, and
wages in subsequent years by 0.5%.
What do these numbers imply about how much referrals reduce the uncertainty about
the worker's productivity? And by how much do they increase welfare, through noise
reduction and better matches? In addition to the noise of the productivity signal in the
referral market, 2
R; the key parameter that governs the welfare gain of referrals is the
learning rate, : information about the job market candidate prior to the hire is the more
28valuable the slower agents learn.
To illustrate the potential welfare gains due to referrals, we use the structure of our
model to uncover these two parameters. We do that by matching two key data moments,
the dierence between the log wage of referral and external hires at the beginning of
the employment relationship (lnwData
Entry = 0:031) and the dierence between the log
wage of referral and external hires in subsequent years of the employment relationship
(lnwData
Subsequent = 0:005), to their model equivalents. The model equivalents lnwModel
Entry
and lnwModel
Subsequent are given by equations (A-11) and (A-13) in Appendix A.5. Both are
complicated functions of  and 2
R: In our model, the lower 2
R (relative to 2
E); the larger
lnwModel
Entry. Moreover, the higher ; the lower lnwModel
Subsequent.
We compute these model moments for a ne grid of values for  and 2
R; for given
values of the other parameters in our model. We then pick those values for  and 2
R that



















We describe the values of the other parameters as well as details of the calibration in
Appendix A.5. Assuming a value of 0.5 for the bargaining power () of the workers,
the results from the simulation of the model yield 2
R = 0:56 and  = 0:48, implying
that referrals reduce the uncertainty about the worker's productivity by 46.8% relative
to the external market and that the true productivity of the worker is revealed with a
48% probability in any given period.30
To assess the welfare gain that arises from the noise reduction in the referral market
and the better matches of the workers with their rms, we re-solve the model and calculate
overall welfare, given by the value of being unemployed, assuming that the uncertainty in
the referral market is the same as in the external market, 2
R = 2
E. Our ndings suggest
that welfare increases by 0.75% as a result of the better matches produced through the
referral market. While these numbers have to be interpreted with caution, they do suggest
30We also simulate the model using alternative values for the bargaining power of workers. For  = 0:25,
we nd optimal values of 2
R = 0:32 and  = 0:44; for  = 0:75, we nd optimal values of 2
R = 0:69 and
 = 0:49. Among the three sets of results,  = 0:75 yields the best t with our data moments.
29that the welfare gains from noise reduction due to referrals may be quite large.
7 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we propose novel empirical implications of referral-based job search net-
works, which we derive from a theoretical search model that encompasses both uncertainty
in the labor market and the possibility of hiring through formal channels or through the
network. Using unique matched employer-employee social security data that cover all
workers and rms in one large West German metropolitan area over a 20 year period, we
nd strong support for the predictions of our model. We rst show that rms are more
likely to hire a minority worker from a particular group, rather than a majority worker
or a worker from other groups, if the share of existing minority workers from that group
in the rm is higher. We further nd that, once we control for the non-random sorting of
workers into rms, minority workers earn higher wages, and are less likely to leave their
rms, if they were hired by a rm with a larger share of minority workers from their
own group and are therefore more likely to have obtained the job through the network.
The eects are particularly strong at the beginning of the employment relationship and
rapidly decline with tenure in the rm. Our baseline ndings indicate that a referral raises
wages of workers who have just entered the rm by 3.1%, and wages in subsequent years
by on average 0.5%. These wage eects are stronger for young and low-skilled workers
who have the most to gain from a referral.
Using the structure of our model, we nally illustrate the welfare gains due to noise
reduction through referrals: total welfare in the economy increases by 0.75% as a result
of the additional information provided to employers. Overall, these ndings support
the hypothesis that, through referrals, job search networks help to reduce informational
deciencies in the labor market and lead to productivity gains for workers and rms.
30Appendix A: Theory
A. 1 Value Functions
The value of the match for referred workers
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Wages are determined by Nash bargaining:
W
R
1   U = (W
R
1   U + J
R
1 ): (A-3)
The value of unemployment and a vacancy
This period, workers receive the unemployment benet b. Next period, they obtain a
referral oer with probability R
W; and can choose between W R
1 and U: Workers who did
not receive a referral oer meet a rm in the external market with probability E
W, and
can choose between W E
1 and U: With probability (1 R
W)(1 E
W); workers receive neither
a referral nor an external oer and remain unemployed. The value of being unemployed
therefore equals
















The value of a vacancy can be similarly derived as
















where k is the vacancy cost, R
F is the probability that a worker is referred to the rm,
and E
F is the probability that a rm meets a job seeker in the external market. Since
the free entry condition implies V=0, we have
k = R
FE max(JR




The probability that a rm meets a worker through the referral market is equal to the
probability that the connection of the chosen employee is unemployed. Hence, in steady-
state, R
F = u: The following conditions need to hold for a worker to obtain a referral
31oer: His connection must be employed, work in a rm with a vacancy, and must be
picked to make a referral. Let v denote the steady-state vacancy rate. A rm with Pj
positions will have Pjv vacancies and employ Pj(1   v) workers, on average. Hence, the
probability that a particular worker in the rm is asked to make a referral is v=(1 v); and
R
W = (1 u)v=(1 v):31 The probabilities that a rm meets a worker and that a worker
meets a rm in the external market are E
F = m(uE;vE)=vE and E
W = m(uE;vE)=uE;
where uE = u(1   R
W) and vE = v(1   R
F):
A. 2 Steady State Unemployment and Vacancy Rate
The number of workers obtaining a job in each period equals:


















where Gi(:);i = R;E , denotes the distribution from which expected match qualities are
drawn.32
Turning to the inow into unemployment, each period N(1   u) workers lose their
job for exogenous reasons. Only workers whose productivity is unknown are at risk of
leaving the rm for endogenous reasons. An endogenous separation occurs if workers did
not lose their job for exogenous reasons (1   ), their productivity becomes known ()
this period, and turns out to be below the reservation match quality y: After T periods
with the rm, there are (1  )T(1 )T(NR
0 +NE
0 ) workers whose productivity has not
been revealed yet. Hence, the total number of workers becoming unemployed in each
period equals:
















A. 3 Reservation Match Qualities and Empirical Implications
We begin with computing y; the reservation match quality after the worker's true pro-
ductivity has been revealed. We then derive the reservation match quality for unemployed
workers who are hired through the referral and external market (m
R;m
E). We nally
show that referral hires initially earn higher wages and are less likely to leave the rm,
but that these eects decline with tenure.
31Here, we have assumed that the number of workers that the rm employs always exceeds the number
of vacancies in the rm. For a vacancy rate of 10%, the probability that a rm with 10 positions has at
least 6 vacancies is less than 0.015%.








32Reservation Match Quality for Employed Workers Workers stay with the
rm if the total surplus of the match, S2 = W2   U + J2; is positive. Rearranging W2
and J2 (see Section 2.2) and adding them up yields:
S2 =
y   (1   )U
1   (1   )
:
Hence, the reservation match quality y equals:
y
 = (1   )U;
regardless of whether the worker was hired through the referral or external market.
Reservation Match Quality for Unemployed Workers Next, we derive an
expression for the reservation match quality in the referral and external market, m
R and
m
E. The worker accepts the wage oer if the total surplus of the match, Si
1 = W i
1 U+Ji
1;
i = R;E; is positive. Rearranging W i
1 and Ji
1;i = R;E (see Section 2.2 and equations(A-
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The last term is a positive function of 2




Referral versus External Hires: Wages Using the sharing rule (A-3), referral



























i)) + (1   )(1   )U;i = R;E: (A-9)
Since m
R > m
E; wR > wE:
Making use of sharing rule W2 U = (W2 U+J2), referral and external hires whose








































+(1   )(1   )U;i = R;E:
It is straightforward to show that wi
2 > wi; hence, wages of workers who stay with
their rm increase on average. Numerical simulations show that logwE
2   logwE >
logwR
2  logwR: Hence, referral hires initially earn higher wages than external hires, but
their wage advantage declines with tenure.
Referral versus External Hires: Turnover The probability that a worker whose
productivity has not been revealed yet leaves the rm in the next period equals














Numerical simulations show that Pr(moveji = E) > Pr(move|i = R): Hence, external
hires are initially, at the beginning of the employment relationship, more likely to leave
the rm than referral hires.
The probability that a worker whose productivity has already been revealed leaves
the rm in the next period equals ; the exogenous job destruction rate, and is the same
for referral and external hires. The dierence between the turnover rate of referral and
external hires therefore declines with tenure.
A. 4 Alternative Network Structures
More than one connection Our model assumes that workers are connected to
only one worker. Next, we show that the implications of our model also hold if workers
are connected to more than one worker.33 In this case, the probability that a minority
33We have abstracted from this possibility because workers may end up with more than one referral
job oer in the same period. Hence, workers do not necessarily accept a wage oer if it exceeds the value
of unemployment.








Minj~ uPr(m > m
R) + S(1   ~ u)E
F Pr(m > m
E)
;
where ~ u is the probability that at least one network member is unemployed.34 As in the
model with one connection, a higher share of minority workers in the rm increases the
probability that a minority worker obtained his job through a referral. Moreover, the
probability that a minority worker is hired continues to depend positively on the existing




Minj~ uPr(m > m
R) + S(1   ~ u)E
F Pr(m > m
E)
~ uPr(m > m
R) + (1   ~ u)E
F Pr(m > m
E)
:
More than one ethnic group and partially ethnicity-based networks Next,
suppose instead that there is more than one minority group, and that minority workers are
not only connected with minority workers from their own group, but also with minority
workers from other groups or with majority workers. The probability that a minority
















g0j (g0g   Gg) + Gg)uPr(m > m
R)
+ Sg(1   u)E
F Pr(m > m
E)]
:
Here, g0g (Gg) is the probability that a minority worker from group g0 (a German worker)
is connected to a minority worker from group g: Hence, a higher share of workers from
the own minority group increases the probability of a referral hire as long as a minority
worker is more likely to be connected to a worker from his own group than a German
worker is, gg > Gg: This assumption also implies that a higher share of workers from









g0j (g0g   Gg) + Gg)uPr(m > m
R)
+ Sg(1   u)E
F Pr(m > m
E)]
uPr(m > m
R) + (1   u)E
F Pr(m > m
E)
:
34For simplicity, we have assumed that in case a worker knows more than one unemployed worker, he
randomly refers one of them to his employer. If instead he refers the more productive worker (i.e. the
one with the higher signal), there is an additional reason for why referral hires are better matched with
their rm than external hires.
35A. 5 Calibration
The dierence between the log wage of referral and external hires at the beginning of the






where wR and wE are given by equation (A-9). The mean wage in subsequent years of the
employment relationship is a weighted average of the wage of workers whose productivity
has not been revealed yet, wi; i = R;E; and that of workers whose productivity is known,
wi
2; given by equation (A-10). Let wi
sub;i = R;E; denote this mean wage for workers who
have been hired through the external or referral market, respectively. wi































;i = R;E: (A-12)
The dierence between the log mean wage of referral and external hires in subsequent








In steady state, the probability that a rm meets a worker in the referral market is R
F = u,
the probability that a worker meets a rm in the referral market is R
W = (1 u)v=(1 v),
and the probabilities that a rm meets a worker and that a worker meets a rm in the
external market are E
F = m(uE;vE)=vE and E
W = m(uE;vE)=uE; respectively, where
uE = u(1   R
W) and vE = v(1   R
F): We assume a constant returns to scale matching











W. The time period in our model is one year.
Table A.3 lists the values of the exogenous parameters in our model. We normalize
average productivity () to 1. The initial variance of productivity, 2
; and the variance
of the productivity signal in the external market, 2
E; are taken from Nagyp al (2007)
who estimates these parameters based on a structural model using French data. The
unemployment benet b is set to 0.67, which roughly corresponds to the replacement rate
of unemployment benets. The elasticity with respect to unemployment in the matching
function  is set to 0.67. The vacancy cost is calibrated to match the average unemploy-
ment rate of all dependent employees in Germany between 1990 and 2001 (10.25%). The
job destruction rate  is set to 0.108, the annual quit rate of workers who have been in
the labor market for more than 10 years. The discount factor  is 0.95. We use three
dierent values for the bargaining power of workers,  : 0:25;0:5; and 0:75; corresponding
36to the lower and upper range of parameter values commonly used in the literature.




W of our model for the parameter values in Table A.3 and a ne grid
of values for  and 2
R: There are six equations that determine these variables:
1+2) The reservation match quality of unemployed workers in the referral and external
market, m
R and m
E, given by equation (A-8).
3) The reservation match quality of employed workers, y. Simplifying the value of
unemployment, given by equation (A-4), yields:
y
 = (1   )U























4) The free entry condition, given by (A-5):

























5) The equality of the outow out of unemployment, given by equation (A-6), and the













































v(1   u) = (
E
W)
1=(1 )u(1   (1   u)v=(1   v))
After having solved for these endogenous parameters, we compute for each set of values
for  and 2
R the two model moments given by equations (A-11) and (A-13), using again
the parameter values in Table A.3. We nally compute the squared distance between
the model and data moments, and select those values of  and 2
R that minimize this
distance.
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42(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share of Population Years since 
 Germany (in %) in Germany
1990 2000 2000 Low Medium High 2000
Germans 86.6 84.4 91.1 13.0 66.9 20.2
Ethnic Minorities 13.4 15.6 8.9 41.2 49.9 8.9 17.7
Ethnic Minorities only
Former Yugoslavia 27.6 25.3 15.2 42.5 55.7 1.8 19.0
Turkey 20.3 17.2 27.4 56.4 41.6 2.0 19.8
Austria 15.9 11.1 2.6 14.0 70.4 15.7 23.5
Italy 8.0 7.6 8.5 42.8 50.9 6.3 22.9
Greece 6.6 5.8 5.0 60.7 35.0 4.3 22.2
Poland 1.5 2.1 4.1 35.6 54.2 10.2 10.2
Former Soviet Union 0.1 1.2 3.8 36.5 40.4 23.1 5.1
Other Western Europe 6.9 8.1 10.3 27.4 43.4 29.2 20.1
Central and Eastern Europe 4.4 6.4 3.4 30.4 58.0 11.7 12.0
Asia 3.5 6.8 11.5 53.9 34.9 11.2 10.5
North America 2.0 1.6 1.7 22.7 41.7 35.6 16.4
Africa 1.3 3.4 4.1 58.4 35.1 6.6 11.6
Central and South America 0.6 1.1 1.2 40.1 41.5 18.4 10.6
Others 1.5 2.2 1.2 29.7 59.3 11.0 12.9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled Age ≤30 Age >30
own share, τ-1 0.568 0.498 0.644 0.419 0.103 0.516 0.490
(0.016)** (0.015)** (0.024)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.019)**
Firms 95,158 95,158 59,449 85,850 28,785 78,136 80,337
Observations 2,116,675 2,116,675 967,415 1,695,295 421,040 1,549,110 1,411,500
Year x Minority FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional Control Variables no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Source: Social Security Data, Munich, 1990-2001.
Table 2: The Share of Workers from the Same Ethnic Group and the Probability of Getting Hired (5 Largest Minority Groups)
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Observations are weighted by the number of hires per year. Coefficients with * are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, those
with ** at the 1 percent level.
Note: The table reports the results from regressing the minority-specific shares of new hires for the 5 largest minority groups (Yugoslavs, Turks, Austrians, Italians, and Greeks) on the
corresponding shares of minority workers in the firm in the previous year. Column (1) includes only minority/year fixed effects. Column (2) includes the shares of new hires with low
and medium education, the share of new hires that are women, the lagged shares of workers with low and medium education in the firm, and the lagged share of women in the firm. All
of these controls are interacted with minoritygroup dummies. In addition, the regression includes the minorityshare in the local municipality (222 municipalities), the minority share in
the industry of the firm (12 industries), and the predicted minority share based on the occupational composition of the firm (88 occupations). Regressions in columns (3) to (7) use the
minority-specific shares among new hires of the specified education level or age as the dependent variable, and include the same set of covariates as in column (2).
All
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Note: The first two columns show the share of ethnic minorities in our sample (Munich) in 1990 and 2000. For comparison, the third column displays the share of ethnic minorities in
the overall population, obtained from the German Statistical Office. Columns (3) to (4) report the share of low-, medium-, and high-skilled workers in our sample. Low-skilled workers
are workers who enter the labor market without post-secondary education. Medium-skilled workers are workers who completed an apprenticeship. High-skilled workers are workers
with a college or university degree. The last column reports the average number of years ethnic minorities between 16 and 64 (including those born in Germany) have spent in
Germany, obtained from the German Microcensus.
Sources: Columns (1), (2), and (4) to (6): Social Security Data, Munich, 1990 and 2000. Column (3): Statistical Office. Column (7): German Microcensus.
Share of Workforce Share of Educational
Munich (in %) Attainment in 2000, Munich (in %)Greece Italy Yugoslavia Austria Turkey
Minority Share Greece, τ-1 0.639 -0.014 -0.418 -0.348 0.142
(0.029)** (0.031) (0.074)** (0.043)** (0.069)*
Minority Share Italy, τ-1 0.001 0.679 -0.221 -0.215 -0.245
(0.018) (0.018)** (0.039)** (0.021)** (0.042)**
Minority Share Yugoslavia, τ-1 -0.061 -0.179 0.770 -0.209 -0.322
(0.011)** (0.013)** (0.021)** (0.011)** (0.026)**
Minority Share Austria, τ-1 -0.079 -0.008 -0.003 0.355 -0.264
(0.025)** (0.023) (0.042) (0.021)** (0.041)**
Minority Share Turkey, τ-1 0.027 -0.199 -0.441 -0.308 0.922
(0.019) (0.023)** (0.059)** (0.023)** (0.066)**
Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS, OLS, Fixed Worker Fixed Firm  Fixed Worker and
No Controls Controls Effects Effects Firm Effects
Panel A: Average Effects
Wages
own share, τ-1 -0.190 -0.068 -0.030 0.049 0.042
(0.005)** (0.004)** (0.006)** (0.010)** (0.006)**
Turnover
own share,  τ-1 0.122 0.010 0.039 -0.060 -0.023
(0.003)** (0.003)** (0.009)** (0.006)** (0.014)
Panel B: Tenure Interactions
Wages
own share,  τ-1 -0.187 -0.065 -0.012 0.106 0.070
(0.005)** (0.004)** (0.006)** (0.010)** (0.005)**
own share,  τ-1 X tenure 0.001 -0.001 -0.015 -0.020 -0.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.001)**
Turnover
own share,  τ-1 0.142 0.043 0.023 -0.060 -0.041
(0.004)** (0.004)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.012)**
own share,  τ-1 X tenure -0.010 -0.012 0.020 -0.001 0.019
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.002) (0.001)**
Panel C: First Year versus Subsequent Years
Wages
own share,  τ-1, first year -0.195 -0.073 -0.018 0.101 0.068
(0.004)** (0.003)** (0.007)** (0.009)** (0.006)**
own share,  τ-1, subsequent years -0.163 -0.064 -0.046 0.019 0.010
(0.006)** (0.004)** (0.007)** (0.011) (0.005)*
Turnover
own share,  τ-1, first year 0.149 0.057 0.017 -0.062 -0.064
(0.005)** (0.005)** (0.009)* (0.010)** (0.013)**
own share,  τ-1, subsequent years 0.078 -0.020 0.068 -0.059 0.029
(0.004)** (0.003)** (0.010)** (0.007)** (0.013)*
Source: Social Security Data, Munich, 1990-2001.
Table 4: The Impact of the Share of Workers from the Same Minority Group on Wages and Turnover
Coefficients with * are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, those with ** at the 1 percent level.
Source: Social Security Data, Munich, 1990-2001.
Note: In Panel A, we report the overall impact of the share of workers from the own minority group in the firm one year before the worker
was hired on wages and turnover of minority workers. In Panel B, we allow the impact of the own share to vary by tenure. In Panel C, we
allow for a different impact of the share of own-type workers in a worker's first year at the firm and a worker's subsequent years at the firm.
In Column (1), we control only for the worker's minority status and year fixed effects. In column (2), we add controls for firm and worker
characteristics. The covariates are: 5 firm tenure categories (0 years, 1-2 years, 3-4 years, 5-9 years, ≥10 years), the log of the firm size,
age, age squared, industry dummies, education dummies and a gender indicator. We then add fixed worker effects (column (3)), fixed firm
effects (column (4)), and both fixed worker and firm effects (column (5)). Standard errors are clustered at the worker level in columns (1)
to (4), and bootstrapped in column (5). The number of observations is 5,834,568 (of which 1,083,117 refer to minority workers) in the
wage regressions and 5,323,163 (986,563) in the turnover regressions.
292,837
Table 3: The Share of Workers from the Same Ethnic Group and the Probability of Getting Hired, Multinomial Logit Model
Note: Estimates reported are marginal effects from a multinomial logit model, evaluated at variable means. Control variables included,
besides the shares of the five main minority groups in the previous period, are the education level and gender of the new hire, year fixed
effects, the lagged shares of workers with low and medium education in the firm, the lagged share of women in the firm, 10 district fixed
effects, 12 industry fixed effects and 88 occupation fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Coefficients with * are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, those with ** at the 1 percent level.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fixed Firm- 5 Main Plus Shares Minority  Guest Workers Squared
Baseline Year Effects  Groups Ind. and Mun. Workers Only Only Specification
own share,  τ-1, first year 0.068 0.096 0.073 0.059 0.049 0.054 0.144
(0.006)** (0.010)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.011)**
own share squared, τ-1, first year -0.119
(0.017)**
own share,  τ-1, subsequent years 0.010 0.021 0.012 0.002 -0.017 -0.017 0.044
(0.005)* (0.009)** (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)* (0.009) (0.010)**
own share squared,  τ-1, subsequent years -0.060
(0.013)**
Observations 5,834,568 5,834,568 5,523,809 5,834,568 1,083,117 678,431 5,834,568
Source: Social Security Data, Munich, 1990-2001.
Age ≤30 Age >30 Low-skilled Medium-skilled
own share,  τ-1, first year 0.134 0.002 0.101 0.009
(0.010)** (0.007) (0.008)** (0.008)
own share,  τ-1, subsequent years 0.055 -0.034 0.035 -0.040
(0.014)** (0.007)** (0.009)** (0.008)**
Austrians Non-Austrians Austrians Non-Austrians
own share,  τ-1, first year 0.049 0.069 -0.178 -0.057
(0.025)* (0.005)** (0.074)* (0.016)**
own share,  τ-1, subsequent years -0.025 0.013 0.049 0.025
(0.023) (0.006)* (0.070) (0.015)
Source: Social Security Data, Munich, 1990-2001.
Coefficients with * are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, those with ** at the 1 percent level.
Table 7: Alternative Explanation: Productivity Spillover Effects
Wages Turnover
Note: To test for productivity spillover effects, we display results separately for Austrians (who speak the same
language as and are culturally very similar to Germans) and other non-minorities. Specifications correspond to our
baseline specification in Table 4, Panel C, column 5, and control for both firm and worker fixed effects.
Coefficients with * are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, those with ** at the 1 percent level.
Source: Social Security Data, Munich, 1990-2001.
Table 6: The Impact of the Share of Workers from the Same Minority Group on Wages: Heterogeneity
Age Education
Note: The table investigates whether the benefits of referrals are heterogeneous. We report results separately by age
and by education. Specifications correspond to our baseline specification in Table 4, Panel C, column 5, and control for
both firm and worker fixed effects.
Table 5: The Impact of the Share of Workers from the Same Minority Group on Wages: Robustness Checks
Coefficients with * are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, those with ** at the 1 percent level.
In column (6), we further restrict the sample to minority workers from guest worker countries (Turkey, Greece, Italy, Former Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal). Results in
column (7) correspond to the baseline specification, but we add squared terms of the share variables. All regressions include worker and firm fixed effects. 
Note: The table presents several robustness checks on the impact of the share of workers from the same minority group one year before the worker was hired on wages of
minority workers. The effect is allowed to vary between a worker's first year at the firm and a worker's subsequent years at the firm. For comparison, we first display our
baseline results from Table 4, Panel C, column (5), in column (1). Column (2) allows for a fixed firm-year effect. Column (3) considers only the 5 main minority groups, and
allows all control variables to vary for each of the 5 minority group. In column (4), we add the share of minority workers from the same group in the industry and municipality
one year before the hire as additional controls. Like the corresponding share at the firm level, their effect is allowed to vary between a worker's first year and subsequent years
at the firm. In column (5), we restrict the sample to minority workers, and thus allow the fixed firm effect to vary by minority status.Munich Frankfurt Cologne Hamburg
own share, τ-1 0.498 0.558 0.544 0.530
(0.015)** (0.007)** (0.014)** (0.008)**
Firms 95,158 87,527 107,354 97,047
Observations 2,116,675 1,927,640 2,388,585 2,212,040
Munich Frankfurt Cologne Hamburg
Wages
own share,  τ-1, first year 0.068 0.074 0.128 0.062
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.010)** (0.011)**
own share,  τ-1, subsequent years 0.010 -0.001 0.056 0.003
(0.005)* (0.008) (0.012)** (0.011)
Turnover
own share,  τ-1, first year -0.064 -0.129 -0.055 -0.127
(0.013)** (0.018)** (0.021)** (0.017)**
own share,  τ-1, subsequent years 0.029 0.023 0.054 0.063
(0.013)* (0.019) (0.017)** (0.019)**
Source: Social Security Data, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne and Hamburg, 1990-2001.




variance signal, external market σ
2
E 1.0574
unemployment benefit  b 0.670
matching ρ 0.670
vacancy cost k calibrated
job destruction rate δ 0.108
discount factor β 0.95
bargaining power, workers γ 0.25, 0.5, 0.75
Note: The table reports the values of the model parameters used in the calibration.
Coefficients with * are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, those with ** at the 1 percent level.
Note: The table reports the impact of the share of workers from the own minority group one year before the worker
was hired on wages and turnover decisions of minority workers, for the four largest West German metropolitan areas.
The effect is allowed to vary between a worker's first year at the firm and a worker's subsequent years at the firm.
Regressions control for tenure, age and age squared, firm size, and year fixed effects, and include fixed worker and
firm effects. See Table 4, Panel C, column (5).
Mortensen and Nagypal (2007)
calibrated to match steady state 
unemployment rate (10.25%)
annual quit rate after 10 years in 
labor market




Table A.2: The Impact of the Share of Workers from the Same Minority Group on Wages and Turnover, 
Other Cities
Source: Social Security Data, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, and Hamburg, 1990-2001.
Table A.1: The Share of Workers from the Same Ethnic Group and the Probability of Getting Hired, Other 
Cities
Note: The table reports the results from regressing the minority-specific shares of new hires for the 5 largest
minority groups in each metropolitan area on the corresponding shares of minority workers in the firm in the
previous year. Included controls are the shares of new hires with low and medium education, the share of new hires
that are women, the lagged shares of workers with low and medium education in the firm and the lagged share of
women in the firm. All of these controls are interacted with minority group dummies. In addition, the regression
includes minority/year fixed effects, the minority share in the local community, the minority share in the industry of
the firm, and the predicted minority share based on the occupational composition of the firm (compare Table 2,
column (2)). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Observations are weighted by the number of hires per
year.
Coefficients with * are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, those with ** at the 1 percent level.